Children's Legal Rights Journal
Volume 36

Issue 2

Article 2

2016

Bending the Curve: Reflections on a Decade of Illinois Juvenile
Justice Reform
Diane Geraghty

Follow this and additional works at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Diane Geraghty, Bending the Curve: Reflections on a Decade of Illinois Juvenile Justice Reform, 36 CHILD.
LEGAL RTS. J. 71 (2020).
Available at: https://lawecommons.luc.edu/clrj/vol36/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Children's Legal Rights Journal by an authorized editor of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact
law-library@luc.edu.

Geraghty: Bending the Curve: Reflections on a Decade of Illinois Juvenile J

Bending the Curve: Reflections on a Decade of
Illinois Juvenile Justice Reform
By Diane Geraghty *
I. INTRODUCTION
Over a century ago, Illinois led the way in revolutionizing the world's approach to juvenile
crime by creating a separate system ofjustice for child and adolescent offenders.1 The newjuvenile
court was premised on a belief that children and youth are developmentally different from adults
and that individualized rehabilitation is the key to reforming youth and enhancing community
safety.2 While the juvenile court achieved many individual successes after its establishment, it also
suffered from decades of benign neglect, received belated scrutiny from the U.S. Supreme Court,
and beginning in the 1980s, came under attack for its failure to respond to the perceived problem
of escalating violent juvenile crime.3
The juvenile justice system survived these attacks but not without changes to its traditional
mission, jurisdiction, and functioning. In the final decades of the twentieth century, the majority
of states, including Illinois, changed their laws to allow more youth to be tried in adult court,
amended their juvenile codes to place more emphasis on public safety, and added provisions that
emphasized the goal of punishment over rehabilitation.4 The result was that thousands of young
people were given lengthy prison sentences in adult facilities and even those who remained in
juvenile court were more likely to be dealt with according to principles of retribution rather than
rehabilitation. 5
*A. Kathleen Beazley Chair in Children's Law, Director Civitas ChildLaw Center at Loyola University Chicago

School of Law. Professor Geraghty also directed the Illinois Modelsfor Change initiative and serves as faculty adviser
to the Children'sLegal Rights Journal.The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.
1 The world's first juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899. See ILLINOIS JUVENILE COURT ACT
§1, 1899 ILL. LAWS 131 (current version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1-1-7/1 (West 2015)).
2 See DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 6 (2004) (noting that juvenile court advocates were
influenced by the emerging field of child development that considered adolescents to be more like young children
than mature adults). See also JOAN GITTENS, POOR RELATIONS: THE CHILDREN OF THE STATE IN ILLINOIS, 1818- 1990,
37, 105 (1994) (observing that a young offender's status as an unformed and malleable child was key to the reformers'
decision to create a separate children's court).
3 See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 18
FUTURE OF CHILDREN 15, 16-19 (2008), www.futureofchildren.org (providing a brief overview of the establishment
and development of juvenile justice in the United States). See also THOMAS J. BERNARD & MEGAN C. KURLYCHEK,
THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (2d ed. 2010) (reviewing the history ofjuvenile court and identifying cyclical swings
between periods of lenient and harsh approaches to juvenile crime).
4
See generally THE CHANGING BORDERS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE: TRANSFER OF ADOLESCENTS TO THE CRIMINAL COURT
(Jeffrey Fagan & Franklin E. Zimring eds., 2000) [hereinafter CHANGING BORDERS] (tracing the evolution of transfer
as the principal strategy for responding to increases injuvenile offending and discussing the implications of this trend);
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz
eds., 2000) (exploring a range of juvenile justice issues through the lens of an increased understanding of adolescent
development).
5 G. LARRY MAYS & RICK RUDELL, Do THE CRIME, Do THE TIME: JUVENILE CRIMINALS AND ADULT JUSTICE IN THE
AMERICAN COURT SYSTEM 67 (2012) (noting the impact of transfer on young persons subject to prosecution in adult

court); Patrick Griffin, Legal Boundaries Between the Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems, in FROM JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME 184, 187 (Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2012) [hereinafter Loeber &
Farrington]. See also YOUTH ON TRIAL, supra note 4, at 2 (observing that many states revised their juvenile codes to
stress punishment over rehabilitation).
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At approximately the same time that these policy changes were being adopted across the
country, a new body of science was emerging. For the first time, advances in imaging technology
made it possible to study the human brain as it develops from childhood through adolescence and
into adulthood.6 Among other things, these studies enabled neuroscientists to validate empirically
what the original juvenile court reformers had gleaned through observation and experience-that
behaviors typically associated with youthful offending, including impulsivity, risk-taking, undue
peer influence, and poor judgment-are closely linked to the immature status of the young brain.
This apparent disconnect between the emergent science of adolescent development and the
evolving landscape of juvenile justice policy led the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation to establish the Research Network on Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice. 8
The goal of the Network was to examine juvenile justice policies and practices through the lens of
rigorous science and scholarship. Over the next several years, the Network published a series of
briefs, reports and research papers on issues such as the link between adolescent development and
youth culpability, 9 adolescents' competence to stand trial,"0 and the impact of adult versus juvenile
sanctioning.11 In less than two decades, the work of these and other developmental scientists
changed the arc of the American juvenile justice system, transitioning it from one that viewed
modern-day youth as a new breed of dangerous criminal to one willing to give young offenders a
"culpability-discount" based on an enhanced understanding of the biological, psychological and
social distinctions between youth and adults. Most notably, the U.S. Supreme Court relied heavily
on the adolescent development literature in striking down the juvenile death penalty,12 and in
severely curtailing juvenile life without parole sentences for youth under age eighteen. 13
In 2004, motivated by the new brain science studies and the work of its Research Network,
the MacArthur Foundation began what would eventually become a $165 million investment in
6

See Jay N. Giedd, et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: a Longitudinal MRI Study, 2

861 (1999) (reporting on the results of pediatric neuroimaging studies and finding differences
in the brain's architecture between pre-adolescence and adolescence).
' See REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 91 (Richard J. Bonnie, Robert L. Johnson, Betty
M. Chemers & Julie A. Schuk eds., 2013) (noting that empirical evidence suggests that children and adults differ in
three essential ways: self-regulation in emotionally charged situations; heightened sensitivity to peer influence; and a
lesser ability to make decisions based on future ramifications). See also Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in
Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEV. REV. 339 (1992).
NATURE NEUROSCIENCE

See MACARTHUR FOUNDATION RESEARCH NETWORK ON ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT & JUVENILE JUSTICE, Our
Purpose, http://www.adjj.org/content/about us.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2016).
9 See, e.g., Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental
Immaturity,DiminishedResponsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009 (2003). This article
8

was cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in its decision inRoper v. Simmons, invalidating the juvenile death penalty as a
violation of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment prohibition. See Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569 (2005).
10 See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, et al., Juveniles' Competence to Stand Trial: A ComparisonofAdolescents' andAdults'
Capacitiesas Trial Defendants, 27 L. AND HUM. BEHAV. 333 (2003).
" Thomas A. Loughran, et al., DifferentialEffects ofAdult Transfer on Juvenile Offender Recidivism, 34 LAW. AND
HUM. BEHAV. 476-88 (2010).
12 Roperv. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569-70 (2005) (invalidating capital punishment for juveniles as cruel and unusual
punishment and identifying developmental differences between juveniles and adults as central to its decision to
prohibit the execution of persons under the age of eighteen).
13Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (banning the use of life without parole sentences forjuveniles not convicted
of murder); Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) (invalidating mandatory life without
parole sentences and noting that adolescence is a time of "transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and an inability to
assess consequences"); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 6 (2015) (holding that the decision in Miller v. Alabama
finding mandatory juvenile life without parole unconstitutional applies retroactively).
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juvenile justice reform. The goal of the multi-year, multi -j uri sdiction Modelsfor Change initiative
was to promote policy and practice reforms that would result in a "more rational, fair, effective,
and developmentally appropriate response" to youthful offending. 14 The Foundation began by
identifying a set of principles that would guide the work of the initiative, including ensuring
fundamental fairness, acknowledging developmental differences between youth and adults,
holding youth appropriately accountable, promoting community safety, fostering individual youth
potential, and recognizing system and community responsibility. 15 It then selected four "core"
states to serve as laboratories for reform. 16 The Foundation's expectation was that these
jurisdictions would produce new evidence-based models of law and practice that could be shared
with other states and that would ultimately lead to wholesale juvenile justice reform.1 7 Illinois was
chosen as a core state on the basis of its strong juvenile justice advocacy community, its existing
reform efforts, and its need and readiness for change across various stages of the juvenile justice
system. 18
This Article summarizes how Illinois went about the task of "bending the curve" ofjuvenile
justice systems reform. It begins with a brief overview of the Illinois Modelsfor Change initiative,
followed by examples of how Illinois has been able to more closely align parts of its juvenile
justice system with the initiative's core principles. The Article next identifies key lessons that have
emerged from the decade-long Illinois experiment. It ends on a note of cautious optimism about
the future of juvenile justice reform in Illinois, tempered by recognition that the vagaries of
politics, economics and personalities pose an ever-present threat to the long-term sustainability of
any major reform effort.
II. MODELS FOR CHANGE

A. Initiative Overview
One of the potential strengths and persistent challenges of the American juvenile justice
system is that it is highly fragmented. Laws, leadership structures and resources differ from state
to state and from local jurisdiction to local jurisdiction. This diversity allows responsiveness to
"4 See

MACARTHUR

FOUNDATION,

MODELS

FOR

CHANGE:

A

CALL

FOR

ACTION

3

(2013),

http:/modelsforchange.net/publications/517 (summarizing the goals of Modelsfor Change and highlighting progress

in achieving them over the course of the initiative).
15 See

Background,MODELS FOR CHANGE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/Background-and-principles.html

(last
visited February 10, 2016) (identifying principles that framed the Models for Change Initiative).
16
Id.The four core states were Illinois, Pennsylvania, Louisiana and Washington.
17

See

PATRICK

GRIFFIN,

MODELS

FOR

CHANGE

2008

UPDATE:

GATHERING

FORCE,

3

(2008),

http://modelsforchange.net/publications/105 (providing an overview of the philosophy and structure of the Modelsfor
Change initiative, including the decision to focus on a small number of states and the role of the lead entity in each
core state). To assist in the process of model development and diffusion, the MacArthur Foundation established a
National Resource Bank made up of technical assistance providers with expertise and experience in both subject matter
areas and in strategic change. As the Modelsfor Change initiative drew to a close, several Resource Bank members
were reorganized into a set of Resource Center Partnerships, with a goal of providing juvenile justice stakeholders
with ongoing technical support and training around issues of mental health, indigent defense, dually involved youth,
and status offenders. See

BENJAMIN

CHAMBERS

&

ANNIE

BALEK,

BECAUSE

KIDS

ARE DIFFERENT:

FIVE

4 (2014).
18 See Illinois, MODELS FOR CHANGE, http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/States-for-change/Illinois.html
(last
visited Feb. 2, 2016) [hereinafter MODELS FOR CHANGE] (noting that Illinois established the nation's first juvenile
OPPORTUNITIES FOR REFORMING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

justice system and referencing systems improvements that suggested that Illinois was poised to accelerate the pace of
reform as a core Modelsfor Change state).
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local needs and priorities, but it also hinders the creation of a broad-based vision of what a model
juvenile justice system should look like and impedes the development of a universally-agreed upon
blueprint for achieving that vision. Illinois is a good example of the fragmentation that complicates
systems change. As a state, it is geographically, economically and socially diverse, made up of
102 large and small counties and literally hundreds of municipalities.19 Its juvenile justice system
is largely county-based, with the exception of certain state agencies, including those responsible
for child welfare, juvenile corrections and human services."z
Recognizing the diversity represented in the four core states, the MacArthur Foundation
left it to each state to identify its reform priorities. To ensure a focused approach to systems change,
the Foundation recommended that states center their work around no more than three principal
"targeted areas of improvement."21 Because of the Foundation's institutional commitment to racial
equality, each state was asked to address the pervasive problem of disproportionate minority
contact as one of its subjects.2 2 After consultation with a broad range of stakeholders, the Illinois
Models for Change initiative selected three areas of concentration: adjusting the jurisdictional
boundaries of the juvenile system to reflect the developmental differences between youth and
adults; promoting community-based alternatives over secure confinement; and reducing the overinvolvement of youth of color in the justice system.23
The principal responsibility for managing reform efforts in each Models for Change state
was delegated to a "lead entity" selected and supported by the Foundation.24 In Illinois, Loyola
University Chicago's Civitas ChildLaw Center was chosen for this role. Over the next decade the
Center, working with a small steering committee, solicited proposals from and oversaw the work
of sixteen public and private sub-grantees from around the state.25 Grants supported a range of
19

See

ILLINOIS

COUNTIES

AND

INCORPORATED

MUNICIPALITIES,

ILLINOIS

SECRETARY

OF

STATE

(2012),

https://www.cyberdriveillinois.com/publications/pdfpublications/ipub I1.pdf (containing information on all Illinois
counties,
including maps, population figures, and dates of incorporation).
2
1 See ILLINOIS LEADERS' PERSPECTIVES ON JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRESS, NEEDS AND STRATEGIES, ILLINOIS MODELS
FOR CHANGE 9 (2012),
http://www.google.com/url?sa-t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd = 1&ved=OahUKEwiMl1s-

7kc3KAhWJnYMKHUUkDvMQFggiMAA&url=http%3 A%2F%/o2Fwww.modelsforchange.net%/"2Fpublications%/"2

F455%2FIllinoisLeadersPerspective.pdf&usg=AFQj CNFDoSRZRu4iOwoTnP6Iax29aEjP4g&sig2=3eXWtSrx-GQ4N6-NgB5Vw.
21 See JASON ZIEDENBERG, MODELS FOR CHANGE: BUILDING MOMENTUM FOR JUSTICE REFORM, 7 (2006),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/models for change.pdf (defining targeted areas as
intervention points that have the potential to improve the overall effectiveness of the juvenile justice system).
22 According to the W. Haywood Bums Institute for Juvenile Justice Fairness and Equity, disproportionate minority
contact (DMC), now more appropriately referred to as racial and ethnic disparity (RED), refers to the unequal
treatment of youth in the juvenile justice system. See What is R.E.D?, BURNS INST.,
http://www.bumsinstitute.org/what-is-red/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2015). The Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission has
documented the overrepresentation of youth of color in Illinois at arrest, detention and commitment to the Department
of Juvenile Justice. See DMC: Highlightsfrom the Assessment of Racial and Ethnic Disparitiesin Illinois' Juvenile
Justice System, ILLINOIS DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUST.,
http://ijjc.illinois.gov/sites/ijjc.illinois.gov/files/assets/DMC /"20in%/"20the%/"20lL "20Juvenile /"20Justice%/"2OSyste
0
mo20 -%20Fact2 o2Sheet.pdf.
23 GRIFFIN, supra note 17, at 12.
24

See 2010

OVERVIEW OF MODELS FOR CHANGE:

http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/291

SYSTEMS REFORM IN JUVENILE JUSTICE (Nov.

2010),

[hereinafter 2010 OVERVIEW] (describing the Foundation's grant

making strategy as including selection of a lead grantee organization in each core state to work with key stakeholders
to plan and implement targeted reforms).
25 See MODELS FOR CHANGE, MEASURABLE PROGRESS, 30-33 (2012) [hereinafter MEASURABLE PROGRESS] (listing
Illinois Models for Change grantee organizations).
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activities, including building local juvenile justice governance structures, supporting the use of
evidence-based programming and decision-making, promoting restorative justice practices,
improving data capacity and transparency, and educating stakeholders on the importance of
adolescent development in fashioning juvenile justice policy.2 6 Collectively, these Models for
Change efforts fundamentally altered the way in which Illinois responds to youthful offending.
B. Major Reforms
1. Right-sizing the Juvenile Justice System
i.
Raisingthe Age
One of Illinois' most significant achievements over the last decade was passage of a bill
that raised the age of juvenile court original jurisdiction from seventeen to eighteen. Although
Illinois was one of only a small number of states that treated all seventeen-year-olds as adults, the
pathway to raising the age turned out to be surprisingly difficult. Opponents included a small crosssection of prosecutors, probation officers and judges who worried that adding seventeen- year-olds
to the juvenile system would create unmanageable caseloads, consume a disproportionate
proportion of already stretched resources, and potentially exert a negative influence on younger
youth in the system.2 7
In 2008, the Illinois General Assembly agreed to allow seventeen-year-olds charged with
misdemeanors to be returned to juvenile court.2 8 This approach made Illinois the only state in the
country to have a bifurcated system in which seventeen-year-olds charged with a misdemeanor
went to juvenile court while those charged with a felony were tried as adults.2 9 After the law was
changed, and at the urging of "raise the age" advocates, the Illinois legislature charged the Illinois
Juvenile Justice Commission, the state's federally-mandated state advisory group, with studying
the impact of the new "raise the age" legislation. 30 The Commission undertook a rigorous
exploration of the issue by compiling research, analyzing data, conducting practitioner interviews,
and tracking data on the potential effect of moving all seventeen year olds into the juvenile justice
system. 31 The end result of these cumulative efforts was the adoption of legislation that returned
all seventeen year olds to the original jurisdiction of the juvenile court.32
ii.
LimitingAutomatic Transfer
One of the consequences of the "get tough" on juvenile crime movement in the late 1980s
and early 1990s was to increase the number of youth subject to transfer to the adult criminal justice
system.3 3 Illinois was one of the forerunners in the movement to expand the number and type of
26

See MODELS

FOR CHANGE,

supra note 18 (discussing a representative sample of Illinois Modelsfor Change grantees

and their work).
27 STEPHANIE KOLLMANN, RAISING THE AGE OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION: THE FUTURE OF 17-YEAR-OLDS IN

ILLINOIS' JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (Illinois Juvenile Just. Comm'n ed. 2013) (citing cost, increased probation caseloads and

detention overcrowding as major concerns among those who opposed raising the age of jurisdiction).
28 Public Act 95-1031(2010) (codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-120 (West 2015)).
29 KOLLMANN, supra note 27.
30 Public Act 96-1199 (2011) (codified as amended at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/17A-9(a)(6)) (West 2015)).
31 See generally KOLLMANN, supra note 27 (detailing the process used to comply with the Commission's legislative

directive).
32

Public Act 98-0061 (2013) (codified as amended at 705

ILL.

COMP.

STAT. ANN.

405/5-120 (West 2015)).

33 See CHANGING BORDERS, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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cases subject to transfer.3 4 Prior to 1982, Illinois judges made individualized decisions as to
whether a child should be tried and sentenced as a juvenile or as an adult. 35 That year the Illinois
General Assembly adopted "automatic transfer" legislation that required fifteen- and sixteen-yearolds charged with certain felonies to be prosecuted in adult court.3 6 These automatic transfer
provisions were later expanded to include, among other things, drug offenses committed within
1,000 feet of a school or public housing.37
National research conducted in the wake of the movement to transfer large numbers of
juvenile cases to adult court consistently found that adult prosecution results in poorer outcomes
for communities and individual youth.3 8 Youth who are tried in the adult system, for example,
have higher recidivism rates for more serious crimes than do those who remain in juvenile court.3 9
In addition, automatic transfer laws have a disproportionate impact on youth of color. A report on
transfer in Cook County, Illinois between 1999 and 2000, for example, found that of the 363 youth
who were transferred to criminal court for drug offenses, 99.2 percent were minority youth. 4' This
same study also revealed that the majority of youth subject to automatic transfer were charged with
drug violations. 41 After members of the Illinois General Assembly were provided with these data,
they amended the state's transfer laws to return original jurisdiction over drug cases to the juvenile
court. 42 A follow-up study concluded that the removal of drug cases to juvenile court reduced the
number of youth tried in adult court by more than two-thirds.4 3 Moreover, returning drug cases to
juvenile court jurisdiction neither increased the number of new delinquency petitions nor the
number of drug cases transferred to adult court by juvenile court judges.4 4 The net result of the
drug transfer legislation was that hundreds of youth of color were no longer subject to trial and
sentencing in the adult criminal justice system.
After passage of the drug rollback law, Illinois advocates continued to push for an end to
all automatic transfer. Even after passage of "raise the age" legislation returning seventeen-yearolds to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, each year large numbers of youth were subject to the
state's automatic transfer laws. 45 Faced with this ongoing reality, the Illinois Juvenile Justice
Initiative, a Modelsfor Change grantee, issued a new report examining adult prosecutions of Cook
County youth in the years 2010-2012.46 That study highlighted the ongoing disproportionate
31 ELIZABETH KooY, CHANGING COURSE: A REVIEW OF THE FIRST Two YEARS OF DRUG TRANSFER REFORM IN
ILLINOIS, MODELS FOR CHANGE 7-8 (2008), http://jjjustice.org/changing-course-a-review-of-the-first-two-years-of-

drug-trasnfer-reform-in-Illinois.
35
1Id. at7.
36
37

1d.
]d.

38 See Richard E. Redding, Juvenile Transfer Laws: An Effective Deterrent to Delinquency?, OFFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS (2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/220595.pdf (reviewing studies on the effects of juvenile
transfer).
39
1d. at6.
40 See JASON ZIEDENBERG, DRUGS AND DISPARITY: THE RACIAL IMPACT OF ILLINOIS' PRACTICE OF TRANSFERRING
YOUNG DRUG OFFENDERS TO ADULT COURT 8 (2001), http://www.justicepolicy.org/research/2059 (citing ELIZABETH
KooY, THE STATUS OF AUTOMATIC TRANSFER TO ADULT COURT IN COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (Law Office of the Cook
County Public Defender ed., 2000).
41 Id. at 9. Two-thirds of all youth transferred in Cook County during this period were transferred for a drug offense,
while only twenty-six percent were charged with a violent offense.
42 Public Act 94-0574 (2005) (codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-130 (10) (West 2015)).
13 KOOY, supra note 34, at 11.
44

Id.

45

See infra note 46 and accompanying text.

46

KANAKo ISHIDA, AUTOMATIC ADULT PROSECUTION OF CHILDREN IN COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 2010 - 2012
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impact of Illinois' automatic transfer laws. Of the 257 juveniles automatically transferred during
the time of the study, eighty-three percent were African-American, while only one Caucasian
youth was automatically transferred.4 7 The push to eliminate automatic juvenile transfer in Illinois
received a boost when Cook County Board President Toni Preckwinkle, citing the new study and
its impact on minority youth, threw her support behind the abolition of transfer.4 8 Ultimately this
public-private partnership was successful in securing passage of a bill that significantly curtails
the use of automatic transfer in Illinois.49 Specifically, the legislation eliminates automatic transfer
for all fifteen-year-olds and limits the legislative transfer of sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds to
the most serious offenses.50
2. Reduced Reliance on Secure Confinement
In the early days of the Modelsfor Change initiative, youth who were sentenced to a term
of secure confinement were sent to one of eight youth facilities operated by the Illinois Department
of Corrections. Juvenile reform advocates were concerned about the lack of developmentally
appropriate treatment and services for young people imprisoned in a system built and run for
adults. As a result of their efforts, in 2006 the state legislature uncoupled youth corrections from
the adult system and established the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice. 51 At the time, the new
Department's average daily population was approximately 1,400 youth, with predictions that the
number would grow significantly in the future. Instead, as a result of a series of several mutuallyreinforcing changes in Illinois law and policy, the Department's census has been reduced by onehalf.52 That number is expected to decline further as a result of recent legislation limiting
commitments to the Department.5 3
i.
Redeploy Illinois
An initial step in the effort to reduce Illinois' reliance on secure confinement was the
establishment of a pilot program known as Redeploy Illinois. 54 Prior to the Redeploy initiative, if
a sentencing judge sent a youth to the state-run juvenile corrections system, the state would be
responsible for all costs associated with his or her commitment.5 5 This approach created a perverse
(201 4),http://jjustice.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/Automatic-Adu~t-Prosecution-of-Children-in-Cook-CountyIL.pdf.
47

Id. at 12.

48 John Byrne, Preckwinkle Callsfor End to Automatic Transfers ofMinors to Adult Court, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 12,
2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-preckwinkle-juvenile-court-met-20141212-story.html.

49
Public Act 99-0258 (2016) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/).
5
1Id. Under the new legislation, juvenile court judges have discretion, upon the state's motion and after a hearing, to
transfer sixteen-and seventeen-year olds for adult prosecution. The only exceptions are for youth charged with firstdegree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, and aggravated battery with a firearm. These youth remain subject
to automatic transfer.
51 Public Act 94-0696 (2005) (codified as amended at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/5-15 (West 2015)).
52 See 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, ILL. DEP'T OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 2 (2015) (listing the Department's daily population for
FY 2015 at 725 youth in six secure facilities).
51 See Public Act 99-0268 (2016) (to be codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-710 and 5-750).
(prohibiting judges from committing youth found guilty of a misdemeanor and limiting the amount of time a youth
can serve a sentence in secure confinement to that allowable for an adult committed for the same offense).
51 See generally Redeploy Illinois, ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERV., http://www.dhs.state.il.us/page.aspx?item=31991

(last visited February 26, 2016) [hereinafter Redeploy].
55

See

JASMINE L. TYLER, JASON ZIEDENBERG, AND ERIC LOTKE, COST EFFECTIVE CORRECTIONS: THE FISCAL
ARCHITECTURE OF RATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS 1, 19-23 (Justice Policy Inst. ed., 2006) (citing the problem
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incentive to send youth away from their families and communities to receive services, 5 6 but it also
contradicted research findings that community-based sanctioning can be less costly and more
effective than institutional care. 57
The goal of the Redeploy Illinois initiative is to keep and treat youth in their own communities
rather than committing them to the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice. 58 To accomplish this
goal, Redeploy sites receive state funds to develop and support a range of services for local youth
at risk of incarceration, including mental health and substance abuse treatment, counseling, life
skills education, family services, and crisis intervention. In return, local jurisdictions must agree
to reduce significantly the number of youth they send to state facilities. 59 A study evaluating the
first five years of Redeploy Illinois pilot sites found that youth prison commitments in those
jurisdictions had been cut in half.60 Based on these data, Redeploy Illinois was expanded to other
jurisdictions in the state and assigned a line item in the state's budget. 61 According to a recent
annual report, since its inception Redeploy Illinois has reduced overall commitments to secure
confinement by fifty-three percent and diverted over 1,200 youth away from the Illinois
62
Department of Juvenile Justice, saving nearly $60 million in unnecessary incarceration costs.
ii.
No Less Restrictive Alternatives
By carefully examining several years of Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice commitment
data, Models for Change advocates were able to determine that judges were committing a
significant number of youth to the Department for nonviolent misdemeanor and felony offenses.
In 2010, for example, over half of all commitments fit into these offense categories. 63 Armed with
of state fiscal systems that make it less expensive for local jurisdictions to send youth to state-run secure facilities and
citing Illinois' Redeploy Illinois program as an experiment in using financial incentives to keep youth in their home
communities rather than sending them to state facilities).
56
Id. at 19.
57 See SHAENA

M.

FAzAL, SAFELY HOME: REDUCING YOUTH INCARCERATION AND ACHIEVING POSITIVE YOUTH
OUTCOMES FOR HIGH AND COMPLEX NEED YOUTH THROUGH EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAMS, 5 (2014)

(citing research suggesting that community-based alternatives are less expensive and yield better results than secure
confinement); NANCY A. MARION, COMMUNITY CORRECTION IN OHIO: COST SAVINGS AND PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
3 (2002) (asserting that community corrections alternatives are substantially less expensive than secure confinement
and appear to result in less recidivism). But see Nancy Marion, Effectiveness of Community-based Correctional
Programs: a Case Study, 82 THE PRISON J. 478, 485-93 (2002) (finding that recidivism rates for individuals who
successfully completed a community corrections program and those who were sentenced to prison were similar). See
also THE POTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS TO IMPROVE SAFETY AND REDUCE INCARCERATION, VERA INST.

JUSTICE 8-9 (2013) (warning that, as prison commitments decline, the positive results of community corrections
are threatened by growing caseloads, diminishing resources, and a lack of adequate training for corrections personnel).
58 See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/16.1(A) (West 2015) (identifying the purpose of the program as
deinstitutionalizing juvenile offenders by establishing a continuum of care in local communities).
51 See Redeploy, supra note 54 (explaining that Redeploy counties are obligated to reduce their commitment rates by
a minimum of twenty-five percent).
OF

See Redeploy Illinois Saving Millions and Change Lives, MODELS FOR CHANGE,
http://modelsforchange.net/newsroom/388 (last visited Feb. 26, 2016).
61 REDEPLOY
ILLINOIS ANNUAL REPORT 2012-2013, ILL. DEP'T OF HUMAN
60

SERV.

(Mar. 26,

2014),

http://www.dhs. state.il.us/page.aspx?item=70551.
62 Id. Unfortunately, Illinois' ongoing budget crisis appears to be threatening the success of the Redeploy program.
See Patrick Smith, ForSome Illinois Kids, Budget Battle Means Going to PrisonInstead ofHome, WBEZ 91.5 (Dec.
22, 2015), http://www.wbez.org/news/some-illinois-kids-budget-battle-means-going-prison-instead-home-I 14251.
63 See LISA JACOBS & BETSY CLARK, IMPACT OF ILLINOIS' STATUTORY CHANGE MANDATING THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE

ALTERNATIVE STANDARD (2013) (noting that fifty-three percent of commitments to the Department in 2010 were for
non-violent offenses).
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this data, advocates were successful in supporting new legislation designed to ensure that judges
consider alternatives to incarceration before committing youth to the Department of Juvenile
Justice.6 4 Illinois law now requires that juvenile court sentencing judges be provided with detailed
information on a youth's background, family, and strengths as well as challenges.6 5 In addition,
probation officers or other court personnel must detail for the court the types of services that are
available in the community, the specific services that a youth was offered, and why those services
were unsuccessful. 66 Finally, judges must make a finding on the record that commitment to the
Department of Juvenile Justice is the "least restrictive alternative" based on the evidence presented
to the court. A study on the impact of this legislation found that it has already contributed to the
overall reduction of youth committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice.6 7 In light of declining
commitments to the state's youth prison system, Illinois' governor has announced plans to identify
up to three additional facilities to close, with a goal of further reducing the state's reliance on
secure confinement and saving Illinois taxpayers millions of dollars.68
3. Other System Improvements
In addition to right-sizing the juvenile court system by raising the age of jurisdiction,
limiting automatic transfer, and ensuring that only the most serious offenders are eligible for
placement in a secure setting, Modelsfor Change partners also undertook efforts to improve how
the juvenile justice system functions and to protect the procedural rights of system-involved youth.
An important example of this effort was passage of a bill that requires early access to counsel for
youth who are arrested and detained awaiting trial.6 9 The legislation gives youth a statutory right
to the appointment of a lawyer immediately upon the filing of a petition and provides that no
detention hearing may be held until after the accused has had a meaningful opportunity to consult
with his or her attorney.7" As a result, young people entering the system are now able to receive
informed advice about their case at the front end of the process and their attorneys have access to
the information they need to prepare for their clients' detention hearings and cases.
Another system improvement under Models for Change has been the increased use of
objective screening and assessment tools to identify and treat mental health problems among youth
in the justice system. It is estimated that between sixty-five and seventy percent of detained youth
suffer from a diagnosable mental health disorder.7 1 Failure to identify such a disorder impedes the

64

Public Act 97-0362 (2012) (codified as amended at 705

ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.

405/5-750(1) (West 2015)).

65

Id.
66
Id.
supra note 63. In at least one reported appellate opinion, a judge's commitment order was
reversed when the judge failed to affirmatively consider whether there was an appropriate community-based
alternative to commitment. In re RaheenM., 1 N.E. 86 (Ill. App. Dist. 2013).
68 Marwa Eltagouri, Rauner Cost-Cutting Plan Could Include Suburban Youth Prisons, CHI. TRIBUNE (June 5,
2015),http ://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/batavia-geneva-st-charles/news/ct-tri-juvenirle-correction-centersillinois-rauner-cuts-tl-0611-20150605-story.html.
67 JACOBS

69
70

71

& CLARK,

Public Act 95-0846 (2009) (codified as amended at 705
Id.
See

GINA

HEALTH

M.

ILL.

COMP.

STAT.

ANN. 405/5-415 (West 2015)).

VINCENT, SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS: IDENTIFYING MENTAL

NEEDS AND RISK OF REOFFENDING 1 (Tech. Assistance P'ship for Child and Family Mental Health, ed., 2012)

(citing research showing that between sixty-five and seventy-five percent of justice-system involved youth have at
least one diagnosable mental health need);

SARAH HAMMOND, MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS

4

(Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, ed., 2007) (noting that of the seventy percent of juveniles who have a mental
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rehabilitative process and, in more serious cases, can lead to self-harm or harm to others, including
staff and other youth.72 As a result, juvenile justice and health practitioners have long advocated
for the early identification of mental disorders in youth.73 In order to promote identification of
possible mental disorders among justice-involved youth, and at the urging of juvenile justice and
behavioral health advocates, an early Models for Change activity brought Illinois stakeholders
together to learn about the prevalence of mental health disorders among delinquent youth and to
inform them about the availability of scientifically-validated tools for screening and assessing a
youth's mental health needs. As awareness of the mental health needs of system-involved youth
grew, the use of mental health screening and assessment practices increased around the state.74 At
some point, however, practitioners noted that some youth were unwilling to participate in mental
health evaluations out of a concern that their disclosures might be used against them in their
juvenile court cases.75 The Illinois General Assembly adopted legislation that bars the use of a
juvenile's statement or other incriminating information as evidence of guilt at trial if the statement
was made as part of a behavioral health screening, assessment, or treatment program.76 As a result
of these efforts, today the use of mental health screening and assessment instruments such as the
MAYSI-2 have become routine in many of the state's detention centers, probation departments
and service provider programs.77 In addition, the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice now
screens all youth for mental health disorders when they enter the system. 78 The Department uses
the results of the screening to decide on a youth's classification and placement and to develop a
mental health treatment plan when necessary.
III. FIVE LESSONS LEARNED
As the above examples of changes to Illinois' juvenile justice system suggest, over the
course of a decade Modelsfor Change and its partners were able to achieve significant reforms in
disorder, many have co-occurring disorders such as substance abuse and one in five suffers from a debilitating mental
illness).
72
VINCENT, supra note 71, at 1-2 (discussing the short and longer term benefits of mental health screening as including
immediate identification of youth at risk of suicide as well as helping to identify appropriate longer-term services).
See also David Murphey, Megan Barry and Brigette Vaughn, Mental Health Disorders, CHILD TRENDS
(Jan.2013),http://www.childtrends.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/ChildTrends2013 01 01 AHHMentalDisordersl.pdf

(citing suicide risk and self-harming behaviors in adolescents with mental health disorders and recommending early
identification and treatment as strategies for reducing such behaviors).
73 See, e.g., Thomas Grisso, Adolescent Offenders with Mental Disorders, in JUVENILE JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF

CHILDREN 143-59 (2008) (advocating for improved methods for identifying youth with mental health disorders at all
stages of the juvenile justice process and greater use of community-based networks to provide mental health services
whenever
possible).
74
The Author served as the director of the Illinois Models for Change initiative from 2005 - 2015 when the Foundation
ended its involvement in juvenile justice reform. In her role as director, she was responsible for overseeing all aspects
of the initiative, including substantive programming, administration and grants management. She also co-chaired the
Illinois Juvenile Justice Research Consortium and is a member of the Illinois Juvenile Justice Leadership Council.
7
5

Id.

Public Act 96-1251(2011) (codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-401.5 (h) (West 2015)).
77 See VINCENT, supra note 71 (describing the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument - Version 2 (MAYSI-2) as
76

a7 self-reporting fifty-two-question instrument that measures a variety of symptoms, including suicide ideation).
1 See generally OVERVIEW OF SCREENING AND ASSESSMENT IN ILLINOIS' JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM

Justice Research and Info. Consortium ed.),
http://ijjc.illinois.gov/sites/ijjc.illinois.gov/files/assets/BRIEFING
visited Feb. 2, 2016).
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how the state responds to youthful offending. The following discussion seeks to capture key
lessons of the Illinois Models for Change experience in hopes that they may be useful to those
who, in the future, may take up the challenge of "bending the curve" in the direction of a fairer
and more effective justice system.
A. Create a CriticalMass
As Illinois observed the centennial of the world's first juvenile court in 1999, there was
little doubt that the state's juvenile justice system had strayed from the ideals that had animated
the original juvenile court movement.7 9 A climate of mistrust prevailed among system stakeholders
after a bruising fight between proponents of a "get tough" approach to juvenile crime and those
who advocated for strengthening the existing juvenile justice system.8" State leadership was weak
and uncoordinated, existing improvement efforts were siloed, data systems were antiquated, and
there was little understanding of the deep end of the system. Nonetheless, even prior to Modelsfor
Change there were individuals and organizations working on juvenile justice reform in Illinois.8 1
Their activities brought about important changes to the state's juvenile justice landscape and also
influenced the Foundation's decision to name Illinois as a core Modelsfor Change state.8 2 What
these efforts lacked, however, was a reform locus around which to build a comprehensive juvenile
justice change agenda. By designating a single entity to oversee reform efforts and by identifying
and supporting a small number of state and local grantees, Models for Change was able to pull
together the various strands of work already taking place around the state and create a platform
from which to launch new systemic reform initiatives.
A key Models for Change strategy for building an ever-widening network of public and
private partners was to facilitate knowledge and relationship-building through crosscommunication and collaboration.8 3 The opportunity for stakeholders to work together around a
set of shared objectives was especially important given the fact that what is typically referred to as
the juvenile justice "system" is in reality a collection of many individuals and entities, often with
differing perspectives, responsibilities and resources. The Models for Change initiative employed
a variety of approaches for bringing these diverse groups together, including holding a One
Hundred Leaders' Summit, joining forces with other entities to sponsor statewide conferences that
featured national and local presenters, publishing and distributing materials highlighting the work
and accomplishment of Models for Change grantees and others, mobilizing grassroots campaigns
for legislative change, and creating linkages among local jurisdictions confronting similar
challenges. 8 4 Modelsfor Change partners also engaged in public education efforts, providing state
'9 See Ralph A. Gabric, Band-Aids Won't Cure The Juvenile Justice System, 85 Ill. B. J. 156 (1997) (decrying the rise

in juvenile crime and Cook County's overburdened juvenile court and citing the need for better and more coordinated
services for system-involved youth).
80 See Alma Tolliver, Juvenile Justice on the Brink ofAnother FailedReform: Where Do We Go From Here?, 24 S.

ILL. U. L. J. 569, 577-85, 590 (2000) (citing to 1998 amendments to the Illinois Juvenile Court Act that increased the
punitive orientation of Illinois' juvenile justice system and calling for a greater emphasis on delinquency prevention).
81 See, e.g., Thomas F. Geraghty, The Children & Family Justice Center's 2 0 th Anniversary: Splendid
Accomplishments and a Wonderful Future, 6 N.W. J. L. & SOC. POL'Y 402, 405-08 (2011) (describing successful

efforts on the part of juvenile justice advocates to reform the Cook County Juvenile Court).
82 See MODELS FOR CHANGE, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
83 See GRIFFIN supra note 17, at 12 (noting that the key Illinois strategies for promoting reform included "research,
public education and advocacy, leadership development and support for collaboration, training, and local planning
and
experimentation.").
84
Id. at 12-14.
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policy-makers with background briefings on topics such as adolescent development and alternative
policy options, and making use of media to inform the public about a range of juvenile justice
topics. The net result of these collective efforts was to create a magnifier effect that steadily
increased the visibility and volume of juvenile justice reform efforts in the state and ultimately led
to many of the changes described above.8 5
B. Identify Points ofLeverage
Any effort to improve outcomes for victims, communities and youthful offenders by
improving the fairness and functioning of thejuvenilejustice system is a complex task that requires
a comprehensive understanding of how the system is organized and operates and the roles played
by multiple stakeholders, including judges, lawyers, policy-makers, law enforcement, probation
and correction officers, service providers, families, and community members. To further
complicate matters, because every state's justice system has its own unique structure and culture,
there is no cookie-cutter approach to developing strategies that will be successful across all
jurisdictions.
Against this backdrop, one of the first tasks of the Illinois Modelsfor Change initiative was
to survey the state's juvenile justice system for the purpose of identifying opportunities for reform
as well as potential threats to reform efforts. After conducting this "environmental scan," it quickly
became apparent that a primary pathway to progress might lie through the legislative process.
Several Models for Change partners had a sophisticated understanding of how the legislature
works and an existing record of success in advancing a progressive justice agenda. In addition,
there were members of the General Assembly who were willing to champion reform legislation
even when the odds against passage seemed unfavorable. Finally, successive governors from both
parties either affirmatively supported juvenile justice reform or at least were not inclined to veto
86
bills that made it to their desks.
Against this backdrop, participants in the Illinois Models for Change initiative chose to
pursue a legislative strategy as part of the state's overall juvenile justice improvement plan.8 7 This
early decision to work for change through the legislative process led to many of the state's most
consequential system improvements.8 8 One advantage of this approach is that adoption of a single
piece of legislation can lead to immediate changes with far-reaching effects." 9 A corollary lesson,
85

See PATRICK GRIFFIN,

MODELS

FOR

CHANGE

2009 UPDATE: CORE

STATE

PROGRESS,

6-9 (2009),

http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/296 (highlighting the role of Models for Change in helping to bring
about
fundamental improvements to the state's juvenile justice system).
86
See Public Act 94-0696 (2005) (codified as amended at 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN 5/5-15 (West 2015)) (bill creating
Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice signed by Governor Blagojevch); Public Act 98-0061 (2013) (codified as
amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-120 (West 2015)) (legislation raising the age of juvenile court
jurisdiction signed by Governor Quinn; Public Act 99-0258 (2016) (to be codified as amended in scattered sections
of 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/) (bill rolling back automatic transfer signed by Governor Rauner).
87 These benefits include the creation of a legal framework for how the juvenile justice system functions at every level
of government, while at the same time taking advantage of local experience in fashioning statewide policy. See
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN A DEVELOPMENTAL FRAMEWORK, MACARTHUR FOUNDATION 6 (2015),
http://modelsforchange.net/publications/787 (discussing the unique role state legislation plays in the juvenile justice
system).
88 See supra notes 22-42 and accompanying text.
89 See, e.g., supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (detailing the results of Illinois' decision to return original
jurisdiction over drug offenses to juvenile court, including a sharp reduction in the number of youth of color subject
to trial and sentencing in adult court).
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however, was that passage of a new law does not automatically result in its successful
implementation. For that reason, Models for Change partners affirmatively sought out
opportunities to inform justice system personnel about newly-enacted laws, to answer questions
about the legislation, and to suggest practical implementation strategies. Another effective postadoption effort was to conduct follow-up studies to measure the effect of new legislation. In several
cases these studies turned out to be important opportunities for laying the groundwork for
subsequent policy and practice changes.9"
C. Focus on Local Communities
In addition to promoting statewide "top-down" reform efforts, the Models for Change
initiative invested heavily in supporting systems change at the local level where juvenile crime
occurs and where it most directly affects individual victims, offenders, family members, and the
community. Recognizing that local leaders are in the best position to understand their
communities' unique problems and needs, five geographically-diverse jurisdictions ranging from
large urban locales to small rural counties were selected to receive modest grants to identify and
implement proposed reforms in their own local jurisdictions.9 1 Some of the most successful and
replicable models of systems improvement grew out of work done in these sites.
One example of how the work carried out by local Models for Change sites has impacted
the largerjuvenile justice field arose in connection with their collaborative efforts around the issue
of adolescent domestic battery. Nationally, it is estimated that up to one-quarter of youth charged
with assault or battery are accused of having acted violently against a family member, often a
parent.92 In Illinois, three local Models for Change jurisdictions (Cook, DuPage and Ogle
Counties) independently observed that a disproportionate number of the youth in their detention
centers were charged with battery in the home.9 3 They also noted that traditional juvenile justice
interventions did not appear to be effective when dealing with this group of young offenders.94
Because these jurisdictions were regularly brought together to report on their reform efforts and to
share experiences and observations, they decided to work together to better understand the issue
of adolescent domestic battery. After extensive review of local data, state domestic violence laws,
and programs in other jurisdictions, the three sites together developed and tested new models for
working with families in crisis, with a goal of diverting many of these youth from the justice system
entirely.9 5 The three jurisdictions collaboratively identified and built a continuum of care for
See, e.g., supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
The five Illinois counties and organizations that were selected as Illinois Models for Change pilot sites were DuPage
County, Ogle County Juvenile Justice Council, Children's Home Association of Illinois (Peoria), Second Judicial
Circuit, Youth Outreach Services (Cook). See MEASURABLE PROGRESS, supra note 25.
92 See Linda L. Baker, Alison J. Cunningham, and Kimberley Harris, Violence Within Families and Intimate
90
91

Relationships, in

JUVENILE JUSTICE: ADVANCING RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE

224 (Francine T. Sherman &

Francine H. Jacobs, eds., 2011) (citing research on high levels of abuse and victimization experienced by many youth
charged with household violence). Most of these youth have been exposed to various forms of maltreatment and
violence in their young lives. Id. at 224-28. See also Francine T. Sherman, Justice for Girls: Are We Making
Progress?,59 UCLA L. REv. 1584, 1602-03 (2012) (citing a rise in girls' arrests for assault for home-based violence,
with sixty percent of such arrests for violence against a parent).
9' See SHANNON HARTNETT, ET AL., ADOLESCENT DOMESTIC BATTERY: RESPONDING EFFECTIVELY TO FAMILIES IN
CRISIS, ILLINOIS MODELS FOR CHANGE 4 (2012) (citing an overreliance on arrest and detention of youth involved in

domestic disputes).
94
Id. at5.
9
5

Td.
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families and youth affected by domestic violence, including safety planning and crisis intervention
services.9 6 The sites also developed a "typology" designed to help practitioners better understand
the dynamics of family crisis and identify workable intervention strategies. 9" In an effort to diffuse
the knowledge gained by the Illinois sites to other jurisdictions, the National Youth Screening and
Assessment Project, a Models for Change National Resource Bank member, recently conducted a
cross-site validation study of the typology tool developed by the three local sites and, based on the
results, published a manual that is now available for use by states and local jurisdictions across the
nation.98
Another benefit of focusing reform efforts at the community level is that such an approach
showcases local talent and creates a leadership ladder by which knowledgeable and experienced
practitioners and decision-makers who have an "on the ground" perspective can move into
positions of greater authority and influence. This has been the case in Illinois, where several
individuals who originally worked on local Models for Change initiatives later were tapped for
state and national leadership positions, including membership on the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention's Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice, a group charged with
advising the President and Congress on juvenile justice matters.9 9 In their new roles, these Illinois
change agents are in a position to share Illinois' experience and expertise with other jurisdictions
and to suggest new initiatives for Illinois that have worked in other jurisdictions.
D. Collaborate,but Advocate
A core principle of the Models for Change initiative was that systems reform requires the
active involvement and cooperation of system stakeholders."'o This approach was grounded in an
understanding that only those who occupy positions of authority within government have the
ability and resources needed to actually change laws, policies and practices. In furtherance of this
philosophy, many Illinois Models for Change partners worked diligently to identify and build
collaborative relationships with stakeholders across the justice system and other systems, including
education, child welfare and mental health. In some cases this was a relatively straight-forward
task, largely consisting of identifying potential system allies from around the state, establishing
regular channels of communication, and undertaking activities or projects that advanced common
goals. These activities varied and included conducting research, collecting and sharing data,
writing reports, identifying alternative policy and practice approaches, organizing coalitions,
volunteering to undertake tasks normally performed by public employees, and securing alternative
resources. In other cases, especially where advocates and systems' representatives traditionally
held differing views on crime and delinquency, collaboration required targeted efforts to identify
places where the interests of both groups intersected and to establish respectful working
See HARTNETT, supra note 93, at 9-16 (describing the steps taken in each of the three jurisdictions to improve
responses to adolescent domestic battering).
97
d. at 7-9.
96

98

See generally Wendy Nussbaum, et al., Adolescent Domestic Battery Typology Tool Manual, MODELS FOR

CHANGE

(2015) (an instructional resource designed to help stakeholders identify and provide appropriate programming to youth
who commit acts of domestic violence against household members).
99 See Federal Advisory Committee on Juvenile Justice, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
http://www.facjj.org/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2016).
Modelsfor Change: Systems Reform in Juvenile Justice, MACARTHUR FUND.

PREVENTION,
100 See

http://www.modelsforchange.net/about/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2016) (describing the MacArthur
Foundation's Modelsfor Change initiative as "a network of government and court officials, legal advocates, educators,
community leaders, and families" who work together to promote systemic reform of the juvenile justice system).
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relationships aimed at advancing those limited areas of compatibility. In the end, Illinois' success
in achieving significant reforms at the state and local levels over the last decade is a testament to
the wisdom of the MacArthur Foundation's vision of insider-outsider cooperation and to the
transformational power of public/private partnerships.
Nonetheless, one can legitimately ask whether many of the changes that Illinois has made
to its juvenile justice system would have taken place without a strong cadre of juvenile justice
advocates consistently pushing for reform and accountability from the outside.l10 The reality for
all system reform efforts is that while some system partners have a genuine desire to improve the
functioning of their programs and are open to working with anyone who shares their common
goals, other system representatives are hesitant to work with "outsiders" for a number of reasons,
including philosophical differences, political considerations, a natural resistance to change,
consuming workloads, and/or a fear of criticism. 102 Ultimately, a key takeaway to emerge from
Illinois' experience is that reform efforts are rarely an either/or proposition, and that meaningful
change is most likely to occur when non-state actors continuously exert pressure on public systems
headed by strong, forward-looking leaders who are committed to quality improvement and who
are willing to institutionalize reforms in the units of government over which they hold sway.
E. Be Bold
One of the benefits of systems reform over project or program-based approaches is that it
allows reform agents to identify and tackle the largest problems in a system rather than focusing
exclusively on improving smaller pieces.103 This global approach requires reformers to study and
understand the entire system and to develop clear goals around outcomes that realistically can be
achieved, measured and communicated. Having a bold vision, however, does not mean that change
will come easily. Often major shifts in policy require a change in culture, and culture change takes
time. In Illinois, some of the state's most significant achievements were the product of incremental
approaches that involved small steps toward a larger goal. Illinois' ability to raise the age of
juvenile court jurisdiction and eliminate most forms of transfer, for example, each began with a
discrete effort to collect and analyze relevant data.1" 4 Data is important not only because of what
it can reveal about the nature and scope of an issue, but also because it provides an objective basis
for fashioning workable policy recommendations and for lending credibility to calls for systems
change. 105 An approach that proved effective in Illinois for responding to skeptics of change was

101 Although Illinois Modelsfor Change grantees did not engage in litigation, some Illinois agencies were required to
change their policies and practices as a result of lawsuits brought by other reform advocates. See, e.g., M.H. v. Monrail,
Case No. 12CV8523 (N. Dist. Ill. 2012),
http://www.law.northwestem.edu/legalclinic/macarthur/proj ects/treatment/documents/ProposedNoticeofSettlement.
pdf (in which a class action lawsuit challenging Illinois' juvenile parole revocation was settled); R.J. v. Jones, Case
No. 1:12-cv-7289 (2012), http://www.aclu-il.org/r-j-v-bishop22/ (settling a suit challenging conditions, services and
treatment in Illinois' Department of Juvenile Justice).
102 See Robert G. Schwartz, PROMOTING AND SUSTAINING DETENTION REFORMS 26 (identifying "[b]acklash, burnout,
departures, and the erosion of shared values" as impediments to sustaining reform). See also Wesley G. Skogan, Why
Reforms Fail, 18 POLICING & Soc. 23-33 (2008)(laying out reasons that efforts at reforming police organizations fail).
103

See Kathleen Shaw, Challenges in Evaluating Systems Reform, 1 THE

EVALUATION EXCHANGE 1,

2 (1995)

(distinguishing systems reform where the ultimate goal is to improve the lives of those affected by the system from
smaller-scale program improvement initiatives).
104 See supra note 23 and accompanying text; supra note 46 and accompanying text.
105

See Florencio (Larry) Ramirez, Juvenile Delinquency: CurrentIssues, Best Practices,and PromisingApproaches,

AM. BAR ASSOC. (2008),
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to recommend that decision-makers appoint a task force or some other independent body to study
an issue and report its findings and recommendations within a specified period of time. 106 This
strategy ensured that the proposed reform remained on the table and increased the likelihood that
system decision-makers would have confidence in the reliability of recommendations made by an
entity that they themselves had identified.
F. Planfor Sustainability
All reform efforts, no matter how successful, risk losing ground unless affirmative steps
are taken to sustain them over time. New priorities, changes in leadership, loss of funding, and
inertia all pose threats to the momentum and political will that allowed change to occur in the first
place. There are, nonetheless, measures that can be taken to secure policy and practice advances
and continue the process of reform. Research suggests that strong leadership and the active
involvement of key stakeholders can cement existing reforms and accelerate the pace of change
going forward.1" 7 How leadership and system engagement are built and nurtured, however,
depends in part on the governing structures and culture of each state. Illinois, for example, does
not have a tradition of active stakeholder membership organizations focused on juvenile justice
issues. As a consequence, those involved in the Modelsfor Change initiative realized that it would
be essential to establish new leadership structures that could steward system improvement efforts
after the MacArthur Foundation exited the field of juvenile justice.
Responding to this need, a key group of thought-leaders and decision-makers came
together to form the Illinois Juvenile Justice Leadership Council. The Council, co-chaired by two
Illinois Supreme Court Justices and the Director of the Illinois Department of Juvenile Justice, is
made up of over seventy stakeholders from across the state, including judges, probation and law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, defenders, service providers, academics, and youth
advocates. 10 8 The Council meets quarterly to learn about the latest research, identify system
strengths and weaknesses, and establish priorities for change. To date, Council members have
focused their efforts on improving the state's approach to data collection and analysis,
strengthening the role of families in the justice system, identifying effective diversion strategies,
and improving the delivery of mental health and substance abuse services. By working together to
learn about issues faced by juvenile justice policy-makers and front-line workers, members of the
Leadership Council are building a knowledge base and establishing relationships that build on the
foundation formed by Models for Change.
To aid the work of the Leadership Council and advance the state's goal of grounding its
juvenile justice system in evidence-based knowledge, Illinois has also established a
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/gp-solo-magazine-home/gp-solo magazine index/juveniledel
inquency.html (citing reform core strategies of the Annie E. Casey Juvenile Detention Reform Initiative, including
the critical role of accurate data in overcoming myths and promoting agreement leading to improved policy and
practice). See also RAISE THE AGE CT, CONN. JUVENILE JUSTICE ALL., http://www.raisetheagect.org/howimplementation.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2016) (describing how data collection on youth arrests overcame objections
that raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction in Connecticut would be too costly).
106 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
107 NAT'L ASSEMBLY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. ORG./NAT'L COLLABORATION FOR
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supra note 25, at 20 (summarizing the Leadership Council's membership, goals and
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complementary statewide volunteer organization, the Juvenile Justice Research Consortium.1" 9
Chaired by faculty from three of Illinois' leading universities, the Consortium identifies and shares
policy and practice-relevant research, sponsors a regular statewide forum for juvenile justice
researchers and data managers, and helps develop and support an annual research agenda.1 10 The
Consortium's work in turn aids members of the Leadership Council to better understand and assess
the effectiveness of reform initiatives taking place across the state.
IV. WITHER THE FUTURE?
As the MacArthur Foundation's Models for Change initiative draws to a close after a
decade of work in Illinois, there is reason for optimism that the climate of change that has built up
over the last several years will remain a potent force in the ongoing need to produce better
outcomes for victims, offenders and communities. Success in this regard, however, is not assured.
For one thing, Illinois is in the midst of an historic financial and political crisis. As a consequence,
in the last few years there has been steady erosion in the capacity of community-based agencies to
provide high quality, evidence-based services to children and youth in the justice system. 111 Many
agencies have been forced to reduce programming and some have closed their doors.1 12 Others are
on the verge of bankruptcy. In addition, rumors of public agency consolidation continue to swirl
amid growing worries that the overall budget for human services will be significantly reduced.
These concerns overlap with chronic concerns about Illinois' patchwork of community-based
programming which relies on diverse funding streams and which too often operates without
significant accountability or evaluation. To make matters worse, Illinois' deteriorating financial
situation is also threatened by the steady decrease in federal funding to support state and local
juvenile justice reform initiatives.1 13
The reduction in community-based services is of particular concern to the juvenile justice
system, where much of the impetus for reducing reliance on secure confinement has been
motivated by research indicating that community-based alternatives are preferable to
incarceration.114 If community corrections and treatment services continue to disappear, will

109 Id.
"Id.

111 Letter from Hon. George Timberlake's, Illinois Juvenile Justice Commission Chair, to Illinois governor and
members of the legislature expressing concern over cuts to community-based services,
https://www.dhs.state.il.us/OneNetLibrary/27896/documents/By

Division/DCHP/IJJC/ILJuvenilieConmiissionBudg

etLetter.pdf.
112 See, e.g., LISA CHRISTENSEN GEE, LACK OF BUDGET Is DISMANTLING CRITICAL STATE SERVICES (Voices for Ill.
Children ed., Sept. 2015) http://www.voices4kids.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Lack-of-Budget-DismantlingCritical-State-Services-Final.pdf (discussing the impact of a loss of nearly $6 billion in annual state revenues and
identifying categories of affected services, including youth incarceration reduction programs). See also Shia Kapos,
Big Lutheran Social Agency Cuts 750 Jobs Among Budget Impasse, CRAIN'S CHI. BuS. (Jan. 22, 2016),
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160122/NEWS07/16012993 1/big-lutheran-social-agency-cuts-750-jobs-

amid-budget-impasse (discussing budget-fueled cuts to a wide range of agency services, including those affecting
youth.

113Between

2002 and 2015, federal appropriations for juvenile justice declined by more the half, raising concerns that
some states may no longer see a benefit in accepting funds that require compliance with federal policies. See Gary
Gately, FederalJuvenile Justice Funding Declines Precipitously,JUVENILE JUSTICE INFORMATION EXCHANGE (Feb.
12, 2015), http://jjie.org/federal-juvenile-justice-funding-declines-precipitously/.
14 See Public Act 99-0258 (2016) (to be codified as amended at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-805). Supra note
49 and accompanying text. Acting on this bipartisan support, members of Congress recently introduced the federal
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judges and other policy-makers be willing to forego committing youth to detention and the Illinois
Department of Juvenile Justice? And even if local options remain, will they be consolidated into a
network of large agencies that may be forced to offer cookie-cutter services rather than tailoring
interventions to the unique needs of individual youth?1 15
Another concern about Illinois' ability to sustain its progress relates to the cyclical nature
of reform in the juvenile and criminal justice systems. As Thomas Bernard observed in his seminal
research, the history of juvenile justice has been marked by swings between lenient approaches to
juvenile crime followed by more punitive policies grounded in public concern about rising
crime.11 6 The Models for Change initiative both benefitted from and contributed to a national
willingness to re-examine the harsh approach to crime that took hold in the waning decades of the
last century. This trend has accelerated over time as political conservatives, once foes of leniency
in the criminal and juvenile justice systems, have joined forces with traditional reformers in a
bipartisan call to end high incarceration rates and to increase community-based responses and
diversion options.1 17 While this alliance is likely to hold during times of unprecedented low crime
rates, one wonders whether it will persist against the inevitable headwinds that will develop when
crime statistics once again trend upward.
Another challenge for Illinois is the uncertain status of sustainability efforts as the
MacArthur Foundation ends its juvenile justice reform work. The resources provided by the
Foundation have allowed a diverse set of Modelsfor Change grantees to focus their energies on
targeted areas of improvement, to develop collaborative relationships at the local, state and
national levels, and to institutionalize reform through policy and practice. 1 8 Inevitably some of
that focus and energy will be lost without Models for Change at the state's reform core. To date,
however, the majority of former state and local grantees have found alternative sources of funding
and continue to be actively involved in systems improvement, many working in partnership with
other jurisdictions and individuals involved in Modelsfor Change.1 19 The Foundation's far-sighted
emphasis on sustainability in recent years has increased the likelihood that the momentum that has
been built around juvenile justice reform will continue into the foreseeable future.
V. CONCLUSION

Sentencing Reform Corrections Act of 2015, which, among other things, imposes limits on the use of solitary
confinement and expands confidentiality for juvenile records. The Sentencing Reform and CorrectionsAct of 2015,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/10-0 115%2OSentencing%o20Reform% 20and%/"20Corrections%/"2OAct%/"20Section% o2Oby%/"2OSection.pdf (last visited Feb.
2, 2016).
115
See JEROME G. MILLER, LAST ONE OVER THE WALL 226 (2d ed. 1998) (lamenting Massachusetts' decision to award
service contracts to large private agencies at the expense of smaller, more nimble (and less stable) organizations under
then-Governor
Dukakis).
116
BERNARD & KURLYCHECK, supra note 3, at 3-4.
117 See Bill Keller, PrisonRevolt, THE NEW YORKER (June 29, 2015) (commenting on political conservatives' support
for reform initiatives such as raising the age of juvenile court jurisdiction, reducing incarceration, and strengthening
re-entry efforts).
118 See 2010 OVERVIEW, supra note 24.
119 See, e.g., Press Release, Cook County Juvenile Justice System Leaders Pledge Support for Rehabilitation Over
Incarceration (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://staticl.squarespace.com/staticl542cO5bbe4bOb
79760440ecO/t/54e655b ]e4bOj93fe9feb43/1424381361304/JJ
+Commitment news+release Feb]9.pdf(announcingadoption of a set ofjuvenile justice principles by Cook County
government and civic leaders).
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Illinois has changed the fundamental trajectory of the state's juvenile justice system over
the last decade thanks in large measure to the MacArthur Foundation's investment in juvenile
justice reform and to the commitment, hard work and perseverance of public and private partners.
Although much has been accomplished, there is still much work to be done before Illinois can be
said to have fulfilled the vision of the founders of the juvenile court. Fortunately, there are already
strong indications that Illinois is prepared to build on the knowledge, relationships and momentum
that has built up in the state over the last decade. Recently, for example, an expanded group of
public and private stakeholders has come together with a goal of ending juvenile courtroom
shackling and the use of solitary confinement, eliminating punitive juvenile sex offender registries,
developing more effective interventions with unique populations such as girls and LBGT youth,
providing greater confidentiality protections for youth who successfully leave the justice system,
and improving mechanisms for the collection and analysis of data. There is also a well-spring of
support in Illinois for expanding the use of evidence-based restorative justice practices across the
entire continuum of the juvenile justice system. Finally, Illinois has been at the forefront of a
national conversation that asks whether young people in the eighteen to twenty-four age range
should be treated more like juveniles than adults given the developmental research that
increasingly suggests that this age group has not yet achieved full maturity. 120
As states such as Illinois tackle these and other remaining challenges, their work will be
informed by the legacy of the Modelsfor Change initiative. That legacy includes a clear statement
of principles, multiple toolkits and other resources, access to experts, and most of all, an example
of how individuals and organizations can work together to envision new and better ways of holding
youth accountable for their crimes without destroying their chances for responsible citizenship as
fully mature adults.

120 See, e.g., Vincent Schiraldi and Bruce Western, Time to Raise the Juvenile Age Limit, CHI. TRIBUNE (Oct. 6, 2015)

(advocating for new approaches to young adults in the criminal justice system based on developmental brain research);
Rolf Loeber, et al., Overview, Conclusions, and Key Recommendations, in Loeber & Farrington, supra note 5, at 350-

51 (citing European examples of jurisdictions that have separate courts or sentencing schemes for emerging adults).
See also

LAURENCE STEINBERG, AGE OF OPPORTUNITY

215-16 (suggesting that the current line of demarcation

between adolescence and adulthood should be rethought in light of recent human development research).
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